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Abstract
A common method of making a theory more understandable, is
by comparing it to another theory which has been better developed.
Radical interpretation is a theory which attempts to explain how com-
munication has meaning. Radical interpretation is treated as another
time-dependent theory and compared to the time dependent theory
of biological evolution. The main reason for doing this is to find the
nature of the time dependence; producing analogs between the two
theories is a necessary prerequisite to this and brings up many prob-
lems. Once the nature of the time dependence is better known it might
allow the underlying mechanism to be uncovered. Several similarities
and differences are uncovered, there appear to be more differences
than similarities.
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1 Introduction
Semantics. Semantics is the systematic study of meaning, see for example
Vendler (1974) [66]. In the 19th century logic underwent a period of growth.
The main motivation for a renewed interest in logic was a search for the
foundations of mathematics; however two of the main investigators of the
foundations of mathematics, Frege and Russell, extended their enquiry into
the domain of natural languages. The influence of mathematical thinking
thus left a permanent mark on the subsequent study of semantics. To pos-
itivists of the Vienna circle such as Carnap the symbolism of modern logic
represented the grammar or syntax of an ”ideal” language. The semantics
of the positivists ideal language had been given terms of a relationship con-
necting the symbols of this language with observable entities in the world,
or the data of one’s sense experience, or both. Against such a rigid ideal as
logic, natural language appeared to the positivists as vague. Since a large
part of ordinary and philosophical discourse, particularly that concerning
metaphysical and moral issues, could not be captured by an ideal language,
the positivistic approach provided a way to brand all such talk as nonsensi-
cal, or in some sense meaningless. The positivists engaged in a prolonged,
and largely unsuccessful, effort to formulate a criterion of meaningfulness
in terms of empirical verifiability with respect to the sentences formed in
natural language.
Another source of dissatisfaction with natural languages is the Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis, see for example Kay and Kempton (1984) [33]. This hy-
pothesis of linguistic relativity implied that the particular language a person
learns and uses determines the framework of his perceptions and thought.
If that language is vague and inaccurate, as the positivists suggested, or is
burdened with the prejudices and superstitions of an ignorant past, as some
cultural anthropologists averred, then it is bound to render the user’s think-
ing confused. Natural language did not remain without champions in the
face of the above two approaches. The philosophy of ”ordinary language”
came into its own in the 1940’s. According to the philosophers of this group,
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natural language, far from being the crude instrument the positivists alleged
it to be, provides the basic and unavoidable source of all thought; suggesting
that any formal language can make sense only as an extension of, but never
as a replacement for, natural language. If philosophical problems arise as
a result of a failure to see the workings of man’s language then they can
”dissolve” with improved understanding. Harris and Chomsky developed
transformational, or generative, grammar thus opening a fresh insight into
the syntax of natural languages. Instead of merely providing a structural
description in the form of parsing of sentences, this approach demonstrates
how sentences are built up, from basic small ingredients, thus elucidating the
formal components of natural language.
Motivation Since Darwin propounded the theory of natural selection in
1859 there have been many attempts to compare and contrast it with other
time-dependent phenomenon. In fact such endeavours began before then, for
example Monboddo and Tylor’s approach to anthropology and also Spencer’s
1852 synthetic philosophy. Some of the pitfalls and advantages of comparing
theories to biological evolution are illustrated by Cambell and also Steward’s
(1956) [60] and Frank’s (1998) [18] comparison of biological evolution to cul-
tural change; this is one of the best known comparisons of biological evolution
to a different theory. The advantages are that several disconnected societies
seem to go through similar stages, allowing the possibility of extracting the
factors which cause this. The pitfalls are mainly a result of how to fit interac-
tion between societies into an evolutionary model. Societies gather artifacts
and techniques from one another and thus do not always obtain these in the
same order. The spread of artifacts and techniques can occur either through
cultural diffusion, or alternatively the people that posses them can move, this
is know as demic diffusion Renfew (1994) [54] p.108. An example of demic
diffusion is the spread of farming through Europe, Menozzi et al (1978)[48].
A second frequently made comparison is given by the relationship between
biological evolution and economics, Alchian (1950) [2] p.200:
The economic counterparts of genetic heredity, mutations, and
natural selection are imitation, innovation, and positive profits.
A third comparison is that ideas from evolution have been applied to the
change in conceptual systems, Hull (1992) [29]. Of course, most structures
change with time and can be referred to as ”evolving” and of as being a
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“process”. Thus there is the danger of making straightforward but vacuous
remarks when comparing them. What these examples have in common is an
evolving tree structure (or cladistics), which can be compared. In this paper
biological evolution is compared to radical interpretation There are at least
two reasons for doing this firstly is that it allows it to be shown that there
are more differences than similarities between the two theories, secondly is
that it allows some aspects of radical interpretation to be delineated in the
more precise terminology of biological evolution. The relationship between
language and biology has also been looked at by Barbieri (2003) [4].
Sectional Contents In §2 terms from biological evolution are introduced.
The terms which turn out to be the most useful are those of Gould and
Eldridge (1994) [21] - these terms are not thought by all biologists to be
appropriate for describing biological evolution, but they have a richer struc-
ture which allows more comparisons. In §3 three, approaches to meaning
are introduced. The first is the reference approach, the second is the truth
approach, which is introduced through a discussion of truth in both formal
and natural languages, the third is the use approach, this is similar to the
truth approach, but assigns several attributes in addition to truth to a sen-
tence. Radical interpretation is concerned with how a language community
can assign truth values to the utterances of other members of the same com-
munity. Collections of papers on radical interpretation include Martinich
(1996) [43] and Horwich (1994) [28]; textbooks include Ramberg (1989) [52]
and Evine (1991) [17]; and online articles Kirk (1998) [34] and Malpas (1996)
[42]. According to the notion of radical interpretation assigning truth
is sufficient to assign meaning to these intra-community utterances. The mo-
tivation for this assertion comes from analogy with radical translation and
this in turn is motivated by analogy with truth in formal languages. Truth in
formal languages is most often described by Tarski’s truth theory. Meaning
in formal languages might be constructed by the methods of Angluin (1980)
[3]. Here truth in natural and formal languages is discussed in §3. In §4 the
supposed skill which allows an anthropologist to understand the language of
a previously isolated community and whether this is a particular example of
radical translation is discussed. Traditionally the assignment of truth is what
is required for radical interpretation, here this is generalized to allow for the
possibility that truth is an inadequate notion to describe the quality that is
assigned to linguistic structure; thus truth is replaced by the more guarded
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terminology of extralinguistic information. The extralinguistic information
which drives radical interpretation is usually taken to be supplied by (the
misleadingly termed) principle of charity; in §5 this is replaced by the prin-
ciple of cooperation dominance. In §6 arguments are given showing when
terms in biological evolution have counterparts in radical interpretation.
2 Biological Evolution
Traditional Evolution Biologists account for the origin of existing species
from ancestors unlike current species by invoking the theory of biological evo-
lution, see for example Dawkins (1976) [14], Gould and Eldredge (1993) [21].
The evolution of new species is generated by natural selection. Natural
selection is a process resulting in the survival of those individuals from
a population of plants or animals that were best adapted to the prevailing
environmental conditions; the survivors tend to produce more offspring than
those less well adapted, resulting in the composition of the population being
changed. Natural selection is the process of differential reproduction and
has no necessary connection with survival. Speciation is the origin of new
biological species. Kondrashov (1992) [36] splits speciation into two kinds:
allopatric speciation occurs when species arise as the by-products of evo-
lution in geographically isolated populations, otherwise speciation is sym-
patric. Convergent evolution is the evolutionary development of a
resemblance between unrelated species. Although the resemblances between
convergent organisms may be superficial they do not have to be. Conver-
gence is due to common selection pressures, not similar environments. An
example is the evolution of wings in birds and insects because the fore-limbs
are homologous as fore-limbs. Homologous means having the same evolu-
tionary origin, but sometimes having different functions, an example is that
the wing of a bat and a paddle of a whale are homologous. In greater general-
ity, homology is a relation of correspondence between parts of wholes within
the context of a larger whole, in this case within the context of lineages that
share a common ancestry. Parts are homologous irrespective of function; but
they do not necessarily have different functions. The anterior appendages
of bats and whales make this clear; they are both locomotory and therefore
have the same function of locomotion, but one is used in flight and the other
in swimming and in that sense they have different functions. Analogous
means having the same function but different evolutionary origin, an example
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is that the paddle of a whale and the fin of a fish are analogous. Cladistics
Sneath and Sokal (1973) [58] p.29 is the study of branching sequences, con-
trasted with phenetics, which is the study of similarity. An example is how
many branches an evolutionary tree has, which branch comes off from which
other and in what sequence. If the branches fuse then evolution is referred to
as reticulate, Sneath and Sokal (1973) [58] p.352. Reticulate evolution is
rare in animals but can occur in plants where hybridization between distinct
species and even distinct genera is possible. To quote Maynard-Smith (1987)
[45], the Baldwin effect is
If individuals vary genetically in their capacity to learn, or to
adapt developmentally, then those most able to adapt will leave
most descendants, and the genes responsible will increase in fre-
quency.
Punctuated Equilibrium Traditionally evolution by natural selection
is taken to be both gradual and adaptive. Gradualism means that the
changes which occur are not abrupt and happen in small stages. An adap-
tation is property of the component organisms of a species that has been
acquired because its presence has favoured the survival and reproduction of
those organisms that possessed it. Adaptionistic means changes which hap-
pen in this manner. These days both of these properties are in contention.
Instead of evolution proceeding by gradualism it can proceed by punctuated
equilibrium as discussed by Gould and Eldredge (1993) [21] and by Pinker
and Bloom (1990) [49] p.711. Pinker and Bloom describe punctuated
equilibrium as follows
According to the theory of punctuated equilibrium most evolu-
tionary change does not occur continuously within a lineage, but
is confines to bursts of change that are relatively brief on the ge-
ological time scale, generally corresponding to speciation events,
followed by periods of stasis.
Instead of adaptionism there might be indirect and implicit natural selec-
tion through exaption and spandrelization. Exaption, formely preadaption,
means the adoption of a character that had one use in an ancestral form in
to a new, different use in a descendent form. For example, the bones in the
jaws of the ancestors of mamimals were exapted into the hammer, stirrup
and anvil, the bones of the middle ear. Spandrelization means uses for
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parts which originally occurred as a by-product necessitated by other struc-
ture. The idea of spandrels has been subjected to considerable criticism.
Spandrels come in at least two types. Ephenomenal spandrels in which
the structure is simply a by-product, examples are: the redness of blood, the
hollow at the back of the knee. Spandrels which have since been changed
by direct natural selection are modified spandrels, examples of these are
chins and hexagonal honeycombs. Bowring et al (1993) [9] have calibrated
the rate of early Cambrian evolution and found that the Tommatian and
Atdababian stages lasted less than ten million years. During these stages a
large variety of new life forms appeared, therefore biological evolution must
have scope to accommodate rapid change - traditional gradualism cannot do
this.
3 Approaches to Meaning.
Meaning and Reference. The problem of meaning and reference can be
approached through the following steps, see for example Vendler [66] (1974).
The perception of physical entities such as objects might lead an intelligent
being to the thought of a related happening with some regularity. For exam-
ple, the sight of smoke evokes the idea of fire. The smoke is thus a sign of
some related happening. It is a natural sign, because the connection between
the sign and the thing signified is a causal link. The connection between the
symbol and the thing signified in cases such as road signs is not a natural one;
it is established by tradition or convention and is learned from these sources.
Non-natural signs or symbols are widely used in human communication. The
elements of language appear to be non-natural signs. The interest in words
and phrases reaches beyond their physical sound as their perception is likely
to direct attention or thought to some related happening. Words are the main
media of human communication, and as the diversity of languages shows, the
link involved between words and what they signify cannot be in a simple cor-
respondence. Words mean things that they make us think of; the meaning
of the word can be thought of as the relationship that connects it with that
thing, this is sometimes called correspondence, see §6. There are some words
for which this approach seems to work. The name Paris can refer to the
city of Paris. Beginning with Plato the initial plausibility of such examples
created an obsession in the minds of many thinkers. Regarding proper names
as excellent examples of words, they tried to extend this referential model of
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meaning to all of the other classes of words and phrases. Plato’s theory of
’forms’ can be viewed as an attempt to find a referent for such common nouns
as ’cat’ or for abstract nouns like ’beauty’. The word Socrates in the sentence
’Socrates is wise’ refers to Socrates suggesting that the word wise refers to
the form of wisdom. Unfortunately whereas Socrates was a real person in
this world, the form of wisdom is not something that has been encountered.
The difficulty representing by ’platonic’ entities of this kind increases as one
tries to find appropriate referents for verbs, prepositions, connectives, and so
on. . . .
There are at least two more serious problems with the referential theory
of meaning. The first pointed out by Frege, is that two expressions may have
the same referent without having the same meaning. His example is that
”the Morning Star” and ”the Evening Star” denote the same planet, Venus,
however the two phrases do not have the same meaning. If they had, then
the identity of the Morning star and Evening star would be as obvious to
anybody who understands these phrases. The identity of the Morning Star
with the Evening star is a scientific not a linguistic matter. Thus in the case
of names, it is necessary to distinguish between the referent of a name, and its
connotation or its meaning. The second problem with the theory of referential
meaning arises from meaningful phrases that pretend to refer to something
but do not. A well-used example in the case of such a definite description is
”the present king of France”, the phrase is meaningful although there is no
such person. If the phrase were not meaningful, one would not even know
that the phrase has no actual referent. Russell and Quine’s analysis of these
phrases, detached meaning from reference by claiming that these expressions,
when used in sentences, are equivalent to a set of existential propositions
which are propositions that do not define reference. The example ”the present
king of France is bald” comes out as ”there is at least, and at most, one
person that rules over France, and who ever rules France is bald”. These
propositions are meaningful, true or false, without definite reference, thus
the hope that meaning could be understood in terms of reference is false.
Truth in Formal Languages The positivists suggested verification as the
criterion of empirical meaning; this is to understand a sentence is to know
what state of affairs would make it true or false. Verification suggests a
truth theory of meaning. Here how truth is defined in formal languages is
considered before how to apply this to natural languages. At first sight it
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would seem that if the truth or otherwise of a sentence is known then by
necessity its meaning must be known; furthermore the meaning of a sentence
can be known but its truth be undetermined. Radical interpretation reverses
this picture and takes truth as the primary notion. The truth value of a
sentence is taken to be assigned by appealing to extralinguistic information,
allowing the meaning of a sentence to follow in a manner which allows the best
fit to these truth values. How the assigning of truth values is accomplished
is discussed in the next two sections, this section is limited to conceptions of
truth. Theories of truth have been comprehensively introduced in Kirkham
(1995) [35].
Tarski (1967) [62] p.63 and Evine (1991) [17] p.82 point out that Aristotle
had a notion of truth, expressed in his Metaphysics
To say of what is that it is not, or what is not that it is, is false;
while to say of what is that it is, or what is not that it is not, is
true.
Tarski’s approach is to take a formal object-language which has sentences
that can be true or false, and then compare these sentences to sentences in a
meta-language. In order to consider what would be involved in a definition
of truth, consider what would be involved in any definition. There are two
formal conditions of adequacy and one material condition of adequacy:
formal condition of adequacy 1 the definition must take the form of a
one place predicate,
formal condition of adequacy 2 the definiens must not contain the
definiendum or words constructed from the definiendum,
material condition of adequacy the definition must entail all and only
instances of the word being defined.
The condition of material adequacy for a definition of truth can be expressed
formally using criteria W (also called convention T, form T, schema T):
(W) sεT iff p (1)
where s is sentence in the object-language, and p is a sentence in the meta-
language. A sentence for which (W ) holds is called a W -sentence (also a
T-sentence, Evine (1991) [17] p.80). The sentence in the object language are
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said to be true iff (if and only if) they are true in a meta-language. The same
approach works for languages which have any finite number of sentences.
Now consider a formal object language which consists of a finite number
of sentences and the connectives {not, and, or, if . . . then} of the predicate
calculus. With these one can construct sentences of infinite length and also an
infinite number of sentences. One says a sentence is true iff it is a combination
of true sentences and connectives which are well formed formulas (wffs) and
are true according to the rules of the predicate calculus.
Next one needs a conception of truth which will work for quantified pred-
icate logic. Quantifiers are ∀ (for all) and ∃ (there exists), and these range
over the variables in a sentence. A variable is free in a wff if it is not bound by
a quantifier. A closed sentence has no free variables, every word is specified.
A well formed sentence is open if it has an unbound variable. An example is
’x is the father of John’, it is open because x is not specified. Truth cannot
be assigned directly to open sentences, one has to introduce the notion of
satisfaction. First consider open sentences with one free variable, then the
sentence is satisfied if there is a particular choice of free variable for which
it is true. Sentences can be further complicated by having more than one
unbound variable, there can be an infinite number. In this case an open
sentence is satisfied if there is a sequence (ordered set) for which it is true.
A true sentence in the object language is a sentence which is satisfied by
every sequence.
Truth in Natural Languages It is necessary to have a view on what is
true or otherwise in natural languages in order to discuss radical translation.
Initially definitions of truth which worked in the context of formal logic were
found, and then it was debated whether or not they could be extended to nat-
ural languages. Usually meaning is a more basic property of both sentences
and communication than truth. One cannot ascertain whether a sentence is
true or false if one does not know what it means. In radical translation this
is reversed, it is assumed that one knows what sort of communication is true
or false, and then from this constructs an idea of meaning. This process of
construction being called radical translation. Tarski (1969) [62] p.65 thinks
that the formal language definition of truth cannot be extended to natural
languages because of the antinomy of the liar. I agree with this, this is one of
the reasons that I have for reformulating radical interpretation with extralin-
guistic information assigning a quantity Q to sentences, see Roberts (2003)
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[56]. There are other problems with truth in natural languages, such as sen-
tences often contain demonstratives. Demonstrative means denoting or
belonging to a class of determiners used to point out the individual referent
or referents intended, examples are: this, that, these, and those. Sentences
which contain demonstratives in isolation are not indexed to a particular
context, especially a specific place and time; because of this such sentences
are sometimes referred to as indexical. Thu the problem arises as to how to
assign a truth value to a single sentence which contains an indexical. David-
son’s (1984) [13] p.131 approach is this requires a new theory of truth, which
incorporates natural languages and can be used as a theory of interpretation,
and thence meaning. In Davidson’s approach the first problem that needs to
be addressed is whether Tarski was correct in his contention that his defini-
tion of truth cannot be extended to natural languages. Davidson (1984) [13]
p.133 suggests splitting the problem of truth in natural languages into two
stages:
In the first stage, truth will be characterized, not for the whole
language, but for a carefully gerrymandered part of the language.
This part, thought no doubt clumsy grammatically, will contain
an infinity of sentences which exhaust the expressive part of the
whole language. The second part will match each of the remaining
sentences to one or (in the case of ambiguity) more than one of the
sentences for which truth has been characterized. We may think
of the sentence to which the first stage of the theory applies as
giving the logical form, or deep structure, of all sentences.
I think what Davidson means is that radical translation is a multi-stage pro-
cess. In the first stage one has a simple part or segment of language, which
would say consist of just yes and no assertions in active voice and so on. To
this simple subset of language truth and then meaning are assigned. Then the
subset of language is enlarged and the process starts over again, until finally
most of the language is encompassed. I am not sure if all of the language
is ever reached, after all ambiguity is an aspect of more complex communi-
cation. My view is that the first Davidson stage requires two incompatible
criteria to be met simultaneously, this stage is required to both 1)exhausts
the expressive power of the language, and 2)is only a gerrymandered part of
it; and that the second stage is redundant - once the sentences have been
matched they will have logical form and hence be part of the first stage. An
extreme view is radical pragmatism, the proponents of which hold that there
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is no such thing as literal meaning, the implications of this is that there is
no such thing as a theory of truth even for a formal language.
Another problem with assigning logical form to sentences is that in the
empirical sciences results of experiments are analyzed statistically, resulting
in statements being probabilistic: however for formal languages of the type
considered by Tarski predicate logics etc. . . are used. Yet another problem
is that in formal logic ’implies’ has a definite meaning. The problem is that
’implies’ also has well defined meaning elsewhere, specifically in probability
theory, and the two definitions are not entirely compatible. So the question
arises, why not have a theory of meaning which has probability theory as its
starting point rather than formal logic? This would initially entail assigning
probabilities to sentences rather than just yes or no. The way I think of this,
is to keep the nature of what is assigned open and call it Q, see Roberts
(2003) [56]. The different properties of ’implies’ are discussed in Calabrese
(1987) [11].
Many utterances of natural language are not true or false at all. Whereas
statements, testimonies, and reports are true or false; orders, promises, laws,
regulations, proposals, prayers, curses, and so on are not assessed in terms
of truth or falsity. The employment of words in these speech acts is not
necessarily less relevant to their meaning than their use in speech acts of the
truth-bearing kind.
Meaning and Use. The difficulties just mentioned lead to another the-
ory of meaning sometimes called use theory, see for example Vendler [66]
(1974). This view admits that not all words refer to something, and not
all utterances are true or false. What is common to most words and sen-
tences, is that people use them in speech. Consequently their meaning could
be nothing more than the rules that govern their employment, or in other
words how they are used Use theory originated from at least two places.
Firstly in trying to understand the nature of moral and aesthetic discourse
it was sometimes suggested that words such as ’beautiful’ have an emotive
meaning instead of, or in addition to, the descriptive meaning other words
have; understanding the role or use of such words is to know their meaning.
Secondly Wittgenstein’s (1958) [70] language games in which uses that do
not convey truth plays a dominant role. Human language is apparently a
combination of a great many language ’games’. ’Games’ is how Wittgenstein
refereed to a segment of language where a set of given rules are applied, it
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is an unfortunate nomenclature as it suggests frivolity, however it is now
firmly established. The principle of meaning according to use theory is: the
meaning of a word is the function of its employment in these games. To
Wittgenstein the question ’What is a word really?’ is analogous to ’What
is a piece in chess?’ This led Austin to offer a systematic classification of
the variety of speech acts. Define illocutionary as an act performed by
a speaker by virtue of uttering certain words, as for example the acts of
promising or of threatening. Define performative as denoting an utter-
ance that itself constitutes the act described by the verb. For example, the
sentence I confess that I was there is itself a confession. Define perlocution
as the effect that someone has by uttering certain words, such as frighten-
ing a person. According to Austin, to say something is to do something,
and what one does in saying something is typically indicated by a particular
performative verb prefixing a ”normal form” of the utterance. These verbs,
such as ’state’, ’declare’, ’judge’, and so on, mark the Fregean force of the
utterance in question. If one says ’I shall be there’ then depending on the
circumstances, this utterance may amount to a prediction, a promise, or a
warning. The dimension of truth and falsity is not invoked by all the ut-
terances of the language; therefore it cannot provide an exclusive source of
meaning. In other words truth is one of several attributes. Other attributes
could be feasibility, utility, and moral worth. These attributes could be as
much involved in the understanding of a sentences as the attribute of truth,
and perhaps can be identified with the quality Q, see Roberts (2003) [56].
4 Radical Translation and Interpretation
Radical Translation Radical translation, Quine (1960) [50] Ch.2,
is a hypothetical skill in which an ‘anthropologist’ attempts to assemble a
translation manual for an unknown language. Quine gives an example of
how the translation manual could be compiled, it involves the anthropologist
noting that a ‘native’ utters the word gavagai when a rabbit runs past. The
anthropologist then sets up a hypothesis to test, he guesses that ’gavagai’
means ’there is a rabbit’; he then notes in future when ’gavagai’ means ’there
is a rabbit’ match up, in order to see if any qualification to the translation
is necessary and to confirm that the translation has been successful. In this
behaviourist manner a translation manual between the two languages evolves.
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Radical Interpretation Radical interpretation is a supposed skill similar
to radical translation, but where there is only one language present. Mean-
ing is assigned to sentences in the language when extralinguistic evidence
suggests that it is appropriate to do so; the nature of the extralinguistic evi-
dence is not made explicit; for example there is little variety in the emotional
impact of facial expressions, Ekman et al (1983) [16], so that it is difficult to
imagine substantial extralinguistic evidence originating there. Lewis (1974)
[40] takes the position that radical interpretation applies to all aspects of an
individuals behaviour; this would include intentions and beliefs: meaning is
sometimes expressed in terms of these Grice (1989) [22] p.96. Lewis (1974)
[40] restricts himself to interpretation of an individual, although there ap-
pears to be no bar to applying it to a community. In this case interpretation
would work not only for sentences but for all socially contrived structures:
in particular memes and conventions, defined in the next paragraph, would
be subject to interpretation. There is a danger of having a circular chain of
reasoning here, what if the assignment of extralinguistic information is itself
subject to interpretation. Provided such ‘self-interaction’ is small it should
not interfere with interpretation.
The Size of Structure Interpreted:Memes,Glossemes, and Conven-
tions Gesture and speech have been noted to be used in parallel in human
communication, McNeill (1985) [47], and the question arises as to how large a
chunk of human activity this assigning meaning applies to. Three contenders
are:
• glossemes, Bloomfield (1926) [7], The smallest meaningful units of lan-
guage are called glossemes. Most glossemes have an associated mean-
ing, this is called a noeme.
• memes Dawkins (1976) [14]. A simple definition of a meme, is an
artificially created, non-physical, replicating structure.
• conventions Lewis (1969) [39], Particular cases of memes are given by
conventions, a simple definition of this is a rational self-perpetuating
regularity.
In the definition of a meme artificial means man-made; and non-physical
means that it is an ’idea’ rather than something more readily tangible, here
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questions in the philosophy of mind such as whether an idea is really non-
physical are not addressed. A computer virus can be argued to be either
physical or non-physical, physical seems more plausible as it has a physical
presence which in practise is often identified, thus a computer virus is not a
meme. The original definition of meme [14] was as a unit of intellectual or
cultural information that survives long enough to be recognized as such, and
which can pass from mind to mind. It has led to the theory of memetics,
see Dennett (1995) [15]. The extent of a meme is nebulous, for example
it can consist of single note in a symphony or to the idea of symphonies.
The reason for introducing memes is to emphasize the analogy between the
continuity of ideas held by a language community. This analogy can also be
extended to virus, apparently an example of a ’mind virus’ are chain letters,
Goodenough and Dawkins (1994) [20]. A meme and its perpetuation are not
explicitly physical. In the context of conventions ’rational’ is a limitation on
what can be considered a convention, it is a convention which side of the
road traffic drives on, however if traffic drives on both simultaneously this is
not a convention.
5 Cooperation Dominance
The Origin of Cooperation Dominance Radical interpretation depends
crucially on there being a mechanism by which extralinguistic information
can be used to give truth values to sentences. To discuss this begin by noting
that in radical translation the natives might deliberately mislead the anthro-
pologist for a variety of motives. For the translation to work deliberately
misleading occasions must be in the minority or be detectable by the anthro-
pologist. This observation is elevated to a principle, here called coopera-
tion dominance, which can be simply defined as the disposition of people
to earnestly cooperate preponderating over alternative modes of behaviour.
Traditionally, linguistic cooperation dominance has been referred to as the
principle of charity and it has been thought necessary to invoke it so
that sentences can be given truth values. Quine (1974) [51] p.328 attributed
the phase principle of charity to N.Wilson. Lewis (1974) [40] p.338 holds
that it is a collection of several sub-principles. The principle of cooperation
dominance ensures that cooperation predominates, this essentially ‘drives’,
(alternatively ‘optimizes the process of’ or ‘forces coherence of’) radical in-
terpretation and results in meaningful language. The accuracy and speed at
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which this occurs is positively correlated with fitness for survival thus ulti-
mately radical interpretation is driven by biological evolution. The actual
mechanism by which radical interpretation occurs might be autocatalytic,
Roberts (1999) [55].
Ploy and Counter-Ploy Radical translation is one of at least thirteen
related topics involving the interplay of deceit and cooperation and its evalu-
ation. No detailed comparison is given here. To list the thirteen in no special
order:
1. radical translation as discussed in the previous paragraph,
2. accounting for coterie language. An example is Cockney rhyming slang.
This apparently developed to confuse immigrant workers about the
intentions of native (Cockney) workers in the east-end docks,
3. evaluation the credibility of communication. Social psychologists Ravin
and Rubin (1976/83) [53] p.176, study the credibility of communication,
which entails gauging how useful and truthful communication is,
4. accounting for animal deceit. The collection of papers in Byrne and
Whiten (1988) [10] discuss devious behaviour by animals and together
these make a good case that the reason human intellect evolved, was
in order to enhance social manipulation and expertise in preference
to the prosaic explanation of greater ability to collect food and avoid
predators,
5. accounting for human cognitive abilities. As pointed out by Pinker and
Bloom (1990) [49] p.724, the possession of language is an enormous
advantage that biological evolution will select for strongly. The reason
is that it allows communication of a large amount of information which
aids survival - this leaves open the nature of the useful information.
Survival can be enhanced sometimes by cooperation and sometimes by
selfishness and the interplay of these two factors as great impact leading
to a “cognitive arms race” Pinker and Bloom (1990) [49] p.725,
6. accounting for irrationality. On occasion people do seem to make deci-
sion that are disadvantageous to themselves, Kahnemann et al (1982)
[32], to reconcile this with the principle of cooperation dominance it
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is necessary to assume that people behave rationally with greater fre-
quency. A reason for this could be that the experiments of Kahnemann
et al isolate context in a way that is only discernible to the patient; at
first sight it might not be rational to persevere with the contrived na-
ture of the experiment,
7. nonconsequentialist decisions, Baron (1994) [5] are made by some peo-
ple regardless of their judgement of what the consequences might be,
8. accounting for stupidity. Attempts have been made to define stupidity
Welles (1984) [68], his definition requires nonrational behaviour, this
occasionally has survival advantage; the reason for this is that it en-
hances social cohesion in a peer group, see also de Botton (2004) [8].
Non-rational behaviour has also been discussed by Mackay (1852) [41],
Shermer (1997) [57], and Wheen (2004) [69]. Group thinking can some-
times have beneficial effects and sometimes detrimental effects, Janis
(1982) [31], and Surowiecki (2004) [61]. It seems that when the need
to preserve group harmony and cohesiveness preponderates it is detri-
mental and when there is some self-interest involved it is beneficial,
9. using game theory to explain behaviour. The interplay of cooperation
and deviousness might be quantifiable using game theoretic methods:
game theory has been used in the behavioural sciences for example by
Maynard-Smith (1984) [44], and also by Glance and Huberman (1994)
[19] who find that the amount of cooperation is inversely proportional
to group size,
10. evaluating relevance, see Sperber and Wilson (1987) [59]. As argued in
the fifth point communication allows transfer of large amount of useful
information: for it to be useful suggests that it is in some way relevant.
From this point of view the principle of cooperation dominance is just
a generalization and extension of the maxim of relevance entertained
by Grice (1989) [22] p.27, as relevance ensures speedy communication
of information,
11. various biological altruistic approaches, Hamilton (1964) [23] and Trivers
(1971) [65],
12. the study of cooperation in small scale societies Henrich et al [24]
(2001),
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13. equity theory, Walster et al [67] (1978) which requires the following:
1. In an interpersonal relationship, a person will try to maximize his
or her own outcomes (where outcomes = rewards - costs).
2a. By developing systems whereby resources can be equitably dis-
tributed among members, groups can maximize the probability of eq-
uitable behavior among members.
2b. A group will reward members who behave equitably toward others
and punish those who do not.
3. Inequitable relationships are stressful for those within them. The
greater the inequity, the greater the distress.
4. A person in an inequitable relationship will take steps to reduce
the distress by restoring equity. The more distress felt, the harder the
person will try to restore equity.
6 Comparison of the Theories
The Counterpart to Adaptation by Natural Selection. A corre-
spondence theory, Ramberg (1989) [52] Ch.4, is a theory that attempts
to elucidate a relation between language and the world: the meanings of the
language are called intensions, and the elements of the world are called ex-
tensions. Now assume that a correspondence theory of language is correct
for a significant segment of natural language. In both biological evolution and
radical interpretation there is an optimization process occurring, in biological
evolution it is the optimization of a species to fit its environment through
natural selection, in radical interpretation it is the optimization of the corre-
spondence between intensions and extensions. Thus just as organisms which
are not fit are selected against, correspondences which are inaccurate are
selected against. The counterparts to intensions and extensions could be
intensions corresponding to genotype and extensions corresponding to phe-
notype, but this does not seem to fit. In radical interpretation increasing
correspondence is not the only optimization process, there is also coher-
ence which means the tendency of meanings assigned to a segment of lan-
guage to develop in a way which increases self-consistency. If the manner of
development is by selecting self-consistent meanings then coherence appears
to have the idea of selection already contained in its definition. Another way
of expressing coherence is that an individual’s understanding of a given part
of a language develops in such a way that what it means tends to have less
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internal contradictions. The method by which such development could occur
would involve selection amongst various hypotheses concerning what the part
of the language means. Having two optimization process in radical interpre-
tation is another difference from the single process in biological evolution.
At this point it should be emphasized that we are attempting to explain
language meaning as opposed to linguistic diversity, Renfew (1994) [54] and
Hurford (1998) [30]. Linguistic diversity is concerned with how specific lan-
guage structure spreads, geographically or otherwise. Language meaning is
concerned with how a segment of language carries meaning. Perhaps the
two notions are related and furthermore it might be possible to quantify by
how much. This might be done by appealing to colour terms, Berlin and
Kay (1969) [6]. Assume the description of the eleven focal colours to be
given by eleven noemes (defined in §4), now the spread of the noeme and
the corresponding word can be compared. To summarize the counterpart of
biological natural selection is the increase of accuracy of both correspondence
and coherence.
Mutations Mutations often involve duplications, translocations, and chro-
mosomal rearrangements. Chromosomal rearrangements in biology have
counterparts in language; the straightforward counterparts are given by words
that have occurred through speech errors (such as blends) later being adopted
by the language community. A blend also called a portmanteau word, is a
word formed by joining together the beginning and end of two other words,
an example is ’brunch’ which is a blend of ’breakfast’ and ’lunch’. Mutations
account for biological diversity but not all, and perhaps not even a signifi-
cant part of, language diversity can be accounted for by appealing to speech
errors. Language is creative and at first sight it is hard to accommodate all
of this creativity by appealing to mutations. It may well be that creativity
can be accounted for by having a large number of mutant ideas and then dis-
carding the majority of them, but this would be hard to verify. By mutant
ideas I mean ideas which are original, but do not necessarily posses any other
attribute, they may well not even be well-defined. To summarize mutations
do occur in language, but that the content of the language mainly originated
by creativity, whether creativity can be accounted for by mutations is an
open question.
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The Smoothness of Change In biological evolution change can be grad-
ual or proceed by punctuated equilibria. The question arises as to whether
an interpreter’s interpretation of a language changes gradually or via punc-
tuated equilibria. How large a segment of language radical interpretation
applies to, has been discussed at the end of §4; for simplicity now inter-
pretation is restricted to a single individual. Punctuated equilibria applies
to populations rather than individuals, the punctuated equilibria population
corresponds to the population of parts of a language under interpretation
in a single individual. Consideration of whether an interpreter’s interpreta-
tion changes gradually or by punctuated equilibria depends crucially on the
time-scale involved: here long time scales (of the order of years) are called
coarse-grained, and short time scales (of the order of seconds) are called
fine-grained. First of all consider this question on the fine-grained scale.
Radical interpretation proceeds by assigning truth values to sentences, con-
sider the input of a single sentence and the co-occurring assignment of a
single truth value. Before the utterance there would be one fleeting the-
ory of the language and after it another; thus the theory of the language
jumps discontinuously by a discreet amount: hence on the fine-grained scale
the theory proceeds via punctuated equilibria. This conclusion is dependent
on the extralinguistic information assigned being a two-valued (or bi-valent)
quantity. Discontinuous jumps will also occur if the extralinguistic informa-
tion comes in integer valued packets; however if it is a real-valued quantity
(or quantities) then continuous gradual change might be possible. Davidson
(1984) [13] p.279 says:
No doubt we normally count the ability to shift ground appropri-
ately as part of what we call ’knowing the language’.
From the fine-grained perspective the skill in making small adjustments and
shifting ground appropriately would be the same as knowing the language,
however there is no existent psychological mechanism to demonstrate how
this is done, or how it might manifest itself in consciousness. Secondly
on the coarse-grained time scale an interpreter is said to hold a quiescent
theory of a language. This quiescent theory needs occasional polishing up
and rarely substantial adjustments; the way the quiescent theory changes
can be illustrated by the way that single words change meaning - a new
word can be invented, in which case this part of the theory has a punctuated
equilibrium, however this has just a small impact on a small section of the
theory; hence the quiescent theory usually proceeds by gradualism. In the
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Elizabethan era Shakespeare, Jonson, and others added thousands of new
words to the English language; as this is on the coarse-grained time scale it
effects the quiescent theory. Whether this is an example of a quiescent punc-
tuated equilibria depends on the quantity of change thought to be necessary
for such a classification. Previous writers, e.g. Ramberg (1989) [52] p.102,
hold that an interpreter at a given moment holds a passing theory of the
language. The above Davidson quote suggests to me that a passing theory is
the same as what I have called a fleeting theory, and furthermore that this
is adjusted every time that an utterance is heard, i.e. radical interpretation
of the fleeting theory is an actively occurring process in normal speech.
A similar distinction has been made in language acquisition Campbell
(1979) [12]. Several time scale terms are used here. The first is the micro-
genesis of the language, which is the rapid, moment-by-moment nature of
everyday language processes, by virtue of which we understand and produce
utterances on a time scale that is marked off in seconds and milliseconds. In
contrast there is the macrogenesis of language, this can either refer to an
individuals learning of a first or subsequent language (the ontogenesis of
language) on a time scale of days, weeks, months and years; or to a species
development of linguistic abilities (the phylogenesis of language) on the
time-scale appropriate to human evolution.
Sapir-Worf hypothesis. A problem arises because concepts in one lan-
guage might not have a direct counterpart in the other language; this is an
aspect of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, Kay and Kempton (1984) [33]. If the
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is true then it suggests that meaning can evolve in
isolation, so that there are analogs of allopatric evolution, if not then there
are not.
Metaphor as Exaptation Exaptation has been defined in §2. Let the
counterpart of the exapted parts be words, or more accurately in the present
context the meaning of words. Words are given new uses other than their
‘original’ use in metaphor. For example in the metaphor ‘the mouth of a
river’, mouth can be considered to be an exapted word. Of course ‘exapted
word’ is now itself a metaphor: the point in making it is that it highlights
that in both biological evolution and in language its use is both opportunistic
and creative. Both the metaphor and the original meaning can co-exist in
language, whereas a biological exaptation corresponds to only one character-
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istic, and in this sense they differ.
Spandrels In biological evolution spandrels are parts which originally oc-
curred as a secondary byproduct of primary structure. Letting their counter-
part of the spandrelized parts be words is again an option, but a preferable
one is to let the counterparts be phrases. Idiomatic phrases perhaps occur as
a by-product of other structure, but a better example is puns where the sec-
ondary meaning of the pun can be thought of as a by-product of the primary
intention conveyed by the sentence.
Homologues Homologous words certainly occur. Camera, chamber, and
comrade all have the same evolutionary origin in the Greek word kamara,
but they now have completely distinct meanings.
Analogues Analogous words also occur. Tetrads, verbeins, and basis vec-
tors, terms used respectively by relativists, particle physicists, and pure
mathematicians mean much the same. Examples of analogous words such
as these can always be argued to differ in nuance; but the difference is slight
and appears to be less that the difference between the precise functions of
standard biological analogues such as the functions of fins of fishes and the
paddles of whales.
Convergence Convergence between word meaning frequently occurs, for
example between transitory and caducity. Caducity originally meant a ten-
dency to fall, from the Latin cadere = to fall. (”The caducity of language,
in virtue of which every effusion of the human spirit is lodged in a body of
death.”, attributed by the OED to M.Pattison (1813-84)). Note also that
a words sounds may be identical in two languages and yet have completely
different meanings, depending on the language community of the listeners.
Susceptibility to Initial Conditions In natural languages the meaning
of the two distinct words will never converge to such an extent that they con-
cur in meaning, because they will always have different nuances. An example
of this is every time a language users reads a script written before the words
have closely converged. Thus reticulate evolution between word meaning is
not possible for natural languages. Now in a formal language it is possible
to require by fiat that two words have identical meaning: thus at first sight
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reticulate evolution is possible for formal languages, however the position is
more complex than this. Consider the definition of ’derivative’ in math-
ematics, Thurston (1994) [63] p.163. There are many definitions possible,
Thurston lists as his first seven: the infinitesimal, the symbolic, the logical,
the geometric, rate, approximation, and the microscopic, - and as about the
37th: the cotangent bundle. There is a choice as to which - if any - is con-
sidered the primary definition and which are considered properties. Now if
in a formal text two words are required to have the same meaning this can
be thought of as a reflection of the view of the writer, experienced practi-
tioners of the subject may have other preferences. Thus reticulate evolution
of a solitary word in a formal language is only possible for an individual user
of that formal language, for the community which uses the formal language
reticulate evolution is not possible, so that there is no susceptibility to initial
conditions.
From the vantage point of an individual, the meaning of a sentence ob-
tained from radical interpretation is unusual because there is little sensitivity
to initial conditions. This is illustrated by people who are related and have
been subject to similar environments can have very different views, it seems
safe to say that their ideas on what words and sentences mean will not vary
substantially. From the vantage point of a language community, again there
seems to be little dependence on initial conditions: for example language
communities develop, presumably on occasion independently words to de-
scribe the focal colours, Berlin and Kay (1969) [6]. Susceptibility to initial
conditions is important because of the role that initial conditions hold in dy-
namical theory. Dynamical systems theory is the mathematical theory which
it is hoped will eventually be used to describe all time dependent phenomena.
For its application to biological evolution see for example Hofbauer and Sig-
mut (1988) [26], its terms have been used by analogy to describe individual
word meaning see for example Hinton and Shallice (1991) [25], and for its
wider application in theories of meaning see Hoffman (1987) [27].
Commensurability Kuhn (1970) [37] and Ramberg (1990) [52] Ch.9 dis-
cuss the concept of incommensurability, a simple definition of this is that
the usage of a word becomes incommensurable when its meaning has sub-
stantially diverged in separate language communities. The definition begs
the question of how substantially different and separate affairs have to be
before it is allowable to apply the word incommensurable. If one considers
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the counterpart of a word to be a species then this is a difference from biolog-
ical evolution where a naive view is that it is in principle, but perhaps not in
practice, always possible to tell if a speciation has occurred, for example by
seeing if fertile offspring can be produced from two strands. This naive view
of speciation does not always hold, see the remarks on reticulate evolution at
the end of §3.1, the difference is more one of degree rather than an absolute,
there can be fusion between species. The essence of the above distinction
is that words become incommensurable gradually, whereas, in principle at
least, a species has either split or it has not. The situation becomes more
complex if one considers the counterpart of a word to be other aspects of
biological structure. For example if the counterpart to a word is taken to
a gene, then again the gene has either changed or not, there is no gradual
change of use as in incommensurable words; however whether the effects of
an unchanged gene can change gradually is less clear.
No Counterpart to Speciation In biological evolution speciation is the
evolution of a new biological species. It is not clear what should be taken
to be the counterpart of a species in language. The most common view is
that species are the analogs of languages, geographical races are the analogs
of dialects, and organisms are the analogs of idiolects. In this case the com-
parison is between a species and an individual language, as discussed above
a species has either split or it has not, whereas languages merge from on to
another, so that viewed as a time-dependent process they behave differently.
Schleicher took the view that languages are organisms, then a comparison of
the nature of time-dependent process is then even further apart. A noeme
might appear to be a good counterpart to a species; the reason this does not
work is, again, that there are fairly clear criterion for when a new species
has been formed, and there is no such criteria for when a new glosseme has
formed. One needs a linguistic structure that changes in a more discrete
manner for there to be a good counterpart. The only place where linguistic
structure changes in such a discrete manner is in formal languages, where is
possible to say that a definition is a counterpart of a species. The nature of
their time-dependent change might be similar, but it is not clear how other
structure in biology and formal languages would correspond, for example
there is nothing corresponding to a theorem.
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No Counterpart to the Traditional Gene For the purpose of our com-
parison we use the traditional naive definition of a gene, here called the tradi-
tional gene, as a minimal unit of inheritance of definite size and information
content. The reason that a traditional gene cannot be equated with a word,
is because of the fixed information content of a traditional gene; a words
information content can alter in natural language, although it could be fixed
in a formal language or a computational model. The traditional gene might
be a convenient concept, but the concept of a gene has now changed. Until
1945 the definition of a gene as a unit of inheritance was sufficient to cover
all known genetic data, Lewin (1994) [38] p.70; however developments since
then have shown this naive definition to be inadequate. The idea that a gene
has a definite size is in fact incorrect, genes can disperse from their original
cluster on a chromosome to new locations by chromosomal rearrangement,
Lewin (1994) [38] p.731; thus a gene can no longer be thought of as a unit
on a chromosome as it has been spread around. An example of indefinite
gene size is given by the gene for fragile X syndrome which results in men-
tal retardation in boys. This gene contains repeated sequence of nucleotides
which can expand or contract. If there are relatively few repeats (say less
than 20) then fragile X syndrome does not occur; however if many repeats
occur then the syndrome occurs. The information content of genes is not
fixed either. Genes vary and are becoming increasingly difficult to define. In
the 1940’s Beadle and Tatum proposed ‘one gene for one protein (enzyme)’.
When multi-subunit enzymes were discovered this definition was modified to
‘One gene for one polypeptide.’. Then genes were found to code for RNA
molecules that never were translated into proteins. Even if one just considers
the genes that specify proteins, it is now clear that some genes code for just
part of a polypeptide chain (e.g. in the case of antibodies) while others code
for more than one polypeptide. In one tissue a particular stretch of DNA (a
gene, on the old view) will code for one polypeptide while another time it
might code for a different (albeit related) polypeptide of a different length.
Finally, it is not possible these days even to predict with total accuracy what
amino acids in the polypeptide will be from the sequence of the “gene”. This
is because editing of the mRNA can alter the information content of the gene,
as Figure 1 illustrates, with the ’∗’ indicating the edited mRNA:
Many textbooks just say that a gene is “a minimum unit of inheritance”
but do not dare to say more as there are no further general rules. Even
to say that genes are composed of DNA or RNA is probably inaccurate.
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Figure 1: Editing of mRNA
Evidence for transmissible infectious agents that lack nucleic acids (Prions)
is accumulating, see for example Lewin (1994) [38]. It may well happen
that new concepts emerge from these consideration that suffice to explain
the modern data and reduce to the concept of a traditional gene in some
limit. It is curious to note that molecular biologists use the concept of words
and languages frequently, for example gene libraries and dictionaries. For a
modern gene a comparison with language is more complex as modern genes
can have different functions. One could equate a modern gene with a word
and perhaps say that words also have different function depending on their
syntactic group, noun, verb, etc. . . .
No Counterpart to Hox Genes. Hox genes are involved in the con-
trol of development of structures that display iterative homology, McGinnis
and Krumlauf [46] (1992). The key part of the definition is ’iterative’, the
only thing in natural language that suggests an iterative process is at work
is language acquisition. Large amounts of syntax are learned very quickly by
children, and this suggests that there is some cognitive structure which can
be applied iteratively to do the learning. The problem with identifying some
as yet unknown cognitive structure with the Hox gene is that the Hox gene
is a particular type of gene, and genes perhaps correspond best to words,
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rather than acquisitional structure; so that there would seem to be no coun-
terpart to Hox genes in language. Another way of looking at a comparison
is to note that Hox genes cause a lot of genes to move together, so that the
counterpart of Hox genes would be related to semantic clusters, Agarwal [1]
(1995), moving together. There are examples of concepts moving together
when there is a scientific or technical advance. A mathematical example is
topology where many concepts originate in real analysis. In physics there are
examples of many concepts transferring, say in newtonian mechanics from its
original formulation to its Hamiltonian formulation, however there are many
cases where this does not happen. Take for example ’force’ in newtonian
mechanics, in vacuum general relativity the concept simply does not exist as
particles move along geodesics; how to transfer other concepts, such as angu-
lar momentum, causes problems. A technical example would be the concepts
used to describe aircraft, many of which originated in the description of ships.
Whether there is an analog between the theories seems to depend on what
property of Hox genes one wants to emphasize.
Compositionality Once we have limited ourselves to traditional genes
then it follows that memes, noemes, and similar constructions are funda-
mentally different from traditional genes, because traditional genes have a
definite size and information content but the size of memes and noemes is
indefinite. To illustrate the indefinite size of these objects begin by recall-
ing the definition of a correspondence theory given at the beginning of §6.
Next define compositionality as the term used to say that the meaning
of a sentence depends on the meaning of its parts, see for example Zadrozny
(2000) [71]. This definition implies a restricted domain of applicability for a
noeme. Compositionality must be at best only an approximation, because it
does not take into account environment or context. This has been noted by
philosophers for example Davidson (1984) [13] p.22
Frege said that only in the context of a sentence does a word have
meaning; in the same vein he might have added that only in the
context of a language does a sentence (and hence a word) have
meaning.
One could take the view that the traditional gene has the property of com-
positionality.
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The Antinomy of the Liar It could be added that language itself is a
changing structure, dependent on many aspects of the world, and that these
should also be taken into account in order to say what meaning is; indeed
it is not clear a priori what information could be excluded from a theory of
meaning, and this implies that there can never be an absolute correspondence
between language and the world. When considering the amount of language
necessary for a truth it is straightforward to show that sentences are insuf-
ficient by constructing self-referential truth (SRT) sentences, such as the
antinomy of the liar an example of which is ‘what this sentence says is not
true’. Now the way in which the truth of such sentences can be assigned is
by taking into account sufficient context to disambiguate their self-referential
nature. However the amount of language necessary for as theory of meaning
cannot be disambiguated in such a manner, as the self-referential meaning
(SRM) sentences: ‘This sentence is meaningless’, or ‘What this sentence
means is the opposite of what you think it means.’, and the hybrid self-
referential truth/meaning (SRH) sentence: ‘If this sentences is true then
it is meaningless’, show. The above suggests that meaning is more context
dependent than truth.
Prefix Meaning Appealing to context is a vague procedure without eluci-
dating the nature of its component factors. On the other hand meaning can
be assigned to small linguistic segments such as prefixes and affixes, for ex-
ample bi-, trans-, etc. . . , which certainly have some meaning associated with
themselves, as for example given by the normative definitions of a dictionary.
A codon is a unit that consists of three adjacent bases on a DNA molecule
and that determines the position of a specific amino acid in a protein molecule
during protein synthesis. The counterpart of a codon could be a declension
or a grammatical inflection. A codon could be both the counterpart to that
and also to affix meaning, the ”s” denoting plural, is both an affix and a
decliner. Another analog of prefix meaning is content addressable memory,
which is the ability of people and some machine programs to retrieve infor-
mation based on its contents rather than simply from an address. The more
information which is available the easier it is to retrieve the rest: analogously
for meaning, the greater the linguistic structure and context present the eas-
ier it is to assign meaning. A formal concept which perhaps encompasses
both cases is distal access, Touretzky (1990) [64], which is the ability to
reference a complex structure via an abbreviated tag. Thus when it comes
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to assigning meaning to language the size of structure that this happens to
is unclear. There appears to be nothing analogous a traditional gene; there
is no unit between part of a word and a whole language that it is possible
to say encapsulates meaning. Molecular biology shows the inadequacy of the
traditional idea of a gene as having definite size and information content,
thus the difference is more one of degree rather than an absolute, however
the absence of a unit is much more severe in language.
7 Conclusion
To summarize it is sometimes said that we lean by approximation: radical
interpretation is a prescientific theory which hopes to describe and perhaps
ultimately model how, by iterative approximation, we learn what meaning
is. It is prescientific in the sense that it is not well enough developed to say
what data would refute it; also there appears to be no alternative theory
to judge against it. If a correspondence theory of language is assumed then
radical interpretation is a process by which mental representations of the
world become more accurate. Here it has been argued that radical interpre-
tation applies not just to sentences, but to all socially contrived non-physical
structure; in particular it applies to noemes, memes, and conventions. It was
argued that radical interpretation is a typical time dependent process with
the properties that, subject to certain qualifications explained in the text: on
the fine-grained time scale it proceeds by punctuated equilibrium but on the
coarse-grained time scale it proceeds gradually. Exaptation occurs, an ex-
ample being metaphor. Spandrels, homologues, analogues, and convergence
also occur. Reticulate evolution can only occur in a formal language for an
individual user where it can be introduced by fiat; this cannot happen for a
language community using a formal language or for natural languages. Rad-
ical interpretation shows little sensitivity to initial conditions. Viewed as a
time dependent process radical interpretation has more differences than sim-
ilarities with biological evolution; the origin of this is that (for the purposes
of pre-1945 biology at least) a convenient unit, with a definite information
content, the traditional gene, exists in biology, but no such unit can be found
in a theory of meaning.
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